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Abstract. We investigate determinacy of delay games with Borel win-
ning conditions, infinite-duration two-player games in which one player
may delay her moves to obtain a lookahead on her opponent’s moves.
First, we prove determinacy of such games with respect to a fixed evolu-
tion of the lookahead. However, strategies in such games may depend on
information about the evolution. Thus, we introduce different notions of
universal strategies for both players, which are evolution-independent,
and determine the exact amount of information a universal strategy
needs about the history of a play and the evolution of the lookahead to
be winning. In particular, we show that delay games with Borel winning
conditions are determined with respect to universal strategies. Finally,
we consider decidability problems, e.g., “Does a player have a universal
winning strategy for delay games with a given winning condition?”, for
ω-regular and ω-context-free winning conditions.
1 Introduction
Determinacy is the most fundamental property of a game: a game is determined,
if one of the players has a winning strategy. One can even argue that a deter-
minacy result paved the way for game theory: in 1913, Zermelo proved what
is today known as Zermelo’s theorem [17]: every two-player zero-sum game of
perfect information and finite duration is determined.
In this work, we are concerned with the infinite-duration variant of such
games, so-called Gale-Stewart games. Such a game is played between Player I
and Player O in rounds i ∈ N: in round i, Player I picks a letter α(i) ∈
ΣI and then Player O picks a letter β(i) ∈ ΣO. Player O wins, if the out-
come
(
α(0)
β(0)
)(
α(1)
β(1)
)(
α(2)
β(2)
)
· · · is in the winning condition L ⊆ (ΣI ×ΣO)
ω. Accord-
ingly, a strategy for Player I is a function τ : Σ∗O → ΣI mapping the previous
moves of Player O to the next letter from ΣI to be picked. The definition for
Player O is dual. Note that a strategy cannot access the previous moves deter-
mined by itself. This is not a restriction, as they can always be reconstructed.
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Let ρ(τ, σ) denote the outcome of the play where Player I employs the strat-
egy τ and Player O the strategy σ. Then, determinacy can be characterized
as follows: the negation ∀σ∃τ. ρ(τ, σ) /∈ L of ∃σ∀τ. ρ(τ, σ) ∈ L is equivalent to
∃τ∀σ. ρ(τ, σ) /∈ L, i.e., the order of the quantifiers can be swapped.
Gale-Stewart games are an important tool in set theory and a long line of
research into determinacy results for such games culminated in Martin’s seminal
Borel determinacy theorem [10]: every Gale-Stewart game with a Borel winning
condition is determined. On the other hand, using the axiom of choice, one can
construct non-determined games. Even more so, determinacy of games with ω-
context-free conditions, which are not necessarily Borel, is equivalent to a large
cardinal assumption that is not provable in ZFC [4].
Gale-Stewart games also have important applications in theoretical computer
science as they subsume games studied in automata theory, e.g., parity games
and LTL realizability games. Showing the winning condition of a game to be
Borel and then applying Martin’s theorem is typically the simplest proof of
determinacy for a novel winning condition. However, one can typically obtain
stronger results, e.g., positional determinacy for parity games [2,13]. The quan-
tifier swap induced by this determinacy result underlies (implicitly or explicitly)
all complementation proofs for parity tree automata, the crucial step in proving
decidability of monadic second-order logic over infinite trees.
Delay Games. Oftentimes, the strict alternation of moves in a Gale-Stewart
game is too restrictive to model applications in computer science, e.g., in the
presence of asynchronous components, buffers, or communication between com-
ponents. Delay games, a relaxation of Gale-Stewart games, model such situations
by allowing Player O to delay her moves in order to obtain a lookahead on her
opponent’s moves. This gives her an advantage and allows her to win games she
would lose without lookahead.
Furthermore, delay games have deep connections to uniformization prob-
lems for relations w.r.t. continuous functions [14,15]. Consider a winning condi-
tion L ⊆ (ΣI ×ΣO)
ω : a winning strategy σ for Player O in a game with winning
condition L induces a mapping λσ : Σ
ω
I → Σ
ω
O such that {
(
α
λσ(α)
)
| α ∈ ΣωI } ⊆ L:
we say that λσ uniformizes L. If σ is winning for the Gale-Stewart game with
winning condition L, then λσ is causal: the n-th letter of λσ(α) only depends on
the first n letters of α. Furthermore, if σ is winning in the delay game with win-
ning condition L then λσ is continuous in the Cantor topology. The latter result
can even be refined: if σ only delays moves a bounded number of times during
each play, then λσ is Lipschitz-continuous. Thus, uniformization problems w.r.t.
(Lipschitz-)continuous functions are reducible to solving delay games.
To capture and to analyze the precise amount of lookahead that is necessary
to win, delay games are defined w.r.t. so-called delay functions, which represent
the evolution of the lookahead. Thus, formally Player O does not decide to skip
a move, but the delay function determines how many moves she skips: given a
delay function f : N → N+, the delay game Γf(L) is played in rounds, where in
round i Player I has to pick f(i) letters and afterwards Player O has to pick a
single letter. Thus, if f(i) > 1, then Player O’s lookahead increases by f(i) − 1
letters. Typically, one is interested in the existence of a delay function f that
allows Player O to win Γf (L). One could imagine an alternative formalization
where Player O may explicitly skip moves at her own choice. We will encounter
this variant in Section 5, where it is shown to be equivalent to the one using
delay functions.
Delay games where introduced by Hosch and Landweber who proved decid-
ability of the existence of winning strategies with bounded lookahead for games
with ω-regular winning conditions [7]. Later, Holtmann, Kaiser, and Thomas [6]
proved that for such winning conditions, Player O has a winning strategy with
bounded lookahead if and only if she has one with arbitrary lookahead, i.e.,
bounded lookahead always suffices for ω-regular winning conditions. Further-
more, they gave a doubly-exponential upper bound on the necessary lookahead
and a solution algorithm with doubly-exponential running time. These results
were recently improved [9] by showing a tight exponential bound on the necessary
lookahead and ExpTime-completeness of solving delay games with ω-regular
winning conditions. Finally, delay games with deterministic ω-context-free win-
ning conditions are undecidable [5], while games with max-regular winning con-
ditions w.r.t. bounded lookahead are decidable [18]. All these results can be
expressed in terms of uniformization as well.
For all types of winning conditions mentioned above, delay games w.r.t. a
fixed delay function are determined [5,18]: these results are all ad-hoc as they rely
on the existence of a deterministic automaton recognizing the winning condition
and on determinacy of parity games on countable arenas: one can model the
delay game as such a parity game where each vertex contains the whole history
of the play as well as the state the automaton reaches when processing this
history.
What are Strategies in Delay Games? The most important aspect of a
game are its (winning) strategies, e.g., in controller synthesis it is a winning
strategy for the player representing the system that is turned into a controller.
In a delay game, the notion of strategy is more complex than in a Gale-
Stewart game due to the existence of the delay function: a strategy for Player I is
of the form τ : Σ∗O → Σ
∗
I with |τ(β(0) · · · β(i−1))| = f(i), as he has to determine
f(i) letters in round i. Thus, a strategy for Player I syntactically depends on f
and both players’ strategies may depend semantically on f . On the one hand,
this means that a winning strategy for a game w.r.t. a delay function f might
not be applicable for an f ′ 6= f . On the other hand, dependence on a particular
delay function enables the reconstruction of the own previous moves.
However, the classical definition of strategies for delay games introduced
above is not useful when it comes to applications in synthesis1: the lack of ro-
bustness with regard to changes in the delay function is a serious problem. Fur-
thermore, determinacy for delay games w.r.t. fixed delay functions is a rather
unsatisfactory statement: for every f , either Player I has a winning strategy
for Γf (L) or Player O has one. If ρ(f, τ, σ) denotes the outcome resulting from
Player I employing τ and Player O employing σ in a game w.r.t. f , then the
1 Nevertheless, the definition is still sufficient to study uniformization problems.
negation of ∃σ∀τ. ρ(f, τ, σ) ∈ L is equivalent to ∃τ∀σ. ρ(f, τ, σ) /∈ L. However,
the function f is quantified outside of the negation.
Pushing the negation over the quantification of f yields a much stronger
statement, e.g., either there is an f such that Player O wins Γf (L) or Player I
has a strategy that wins Γf(L) w.r.t. every f . Note that such a strategy has
to be universally applicable and winning for every Γf (L) and may therefore
neither syntactically nor semantically depend on a fix delay function. Thus, a
determinacy result w.r.t. such universal strategies means that the negation of
∃f∃σ∀τ. ρ(f, τ, σ) ∈ L is equivalent to ∃τ∀f∀σ. ρ(f, τ, σ) /∈ L, which is arguably
a more natural notion.
Our Contribution.We study determinacy results for delay games with respect
and without respect to fixed delay functions and with Borel winning conditions.
Firstly, for games with fixed delay functions, we show determinacy w.r.t.
classical strategies that may depend on the function under consideration. This
result generalizes all previous determinacy results obtained via reductions to
countable parity games using deterministic automata recognizing the winning
condition.
Secondly, we introduce universal strategies for delay games: for Player I, we
consider four variants that differ in the amount of information about a play’s
history they can access: the previous moves made by the strategy (which are not
necessarily reconstructible) and the evolution of the lookahead in the previous
rounds. We compare the strength of these strategies in terms of games they are
able to win and show that they form a hierarchy whose first three levels are
strict and that strategies in the fourth level are sufficient to win every game that
is winable. It is open whether the inclusion between the last two levels is strict
or not. For Player O, we only consider two notions of universal strategies, as
the second one is already sufficient to win every winable game. Furthermore, we
show that the hierarchy for Player O is strict, too.
Thirdly, we consider decision problems of the form “Does a player have a uni-
versal strategy for games with some given winning condition L?” for ω-regular
and ω-context-free winning conditions. We prove decidability (and tight com-
plexity results) for both players in the ω-regular case and for Player O i the deter-
ministic ω-context-free case. The other case and both cases for non-deterministic
ω-context-free winning conditions are undecidable.
This work is meant as a starting point into the investigation of more general
notions of strategies in delay games that are independent of the exact evolution of
the lookahead and into determinacy results w.r.t. these notions of strategies. We
raise many open problems that are left open here. Most importantly, the exact
amount of information about a play’s history that is necessary to implement
a universal strategy for Player I is open. Also, most of the decision problems
remain open for the weaker notions of universal strategies we introduce. Finally,
we expect there to be other natural notions of universal strategies for delay
games, which might not have to be winning for every delay function (a very
strong requirement), but for all f for which the given player wins the delay
game Γf (L) using classical strategies.
2 Preliminaries
The set of non-negative integers is denoted by N and we define N+ = N \ {0}.
An alphabet Σ is a non-empty finite set, Σ∗ (Σn, Σω) denotes the set of finite
words (words of length n, infinite words) over Σ. The empty word is denoted by
ε and the length of a finite word w by |w|. For w ∈ Σ∗ ∪Σω and n ∈ N we write
w(n) for the n-th letter of w.
2.1 Delay Games
A delay function is a map f : N → N+. Given an ω-language L ⊆ (ΣI ×ΣO)
ω
and a delay function f , the game Γf(L) is played by two players
2, the input
player “Player I” and the output player “Player O” in rounds i ∈ N as follows:
in round i, Player I picks a word ui ∈ Σ
f(i)
I , then Player O picks one letter
vi ∈ ΣO. We refer to the sequence (u0, v0)(u1, v1)(u2, v2) · · · as a play of Γf (L),
which yields two infinite words α = u0u1u2 · · · and β = v0v1v2 · · · . Player O
wins the play if the outcome
(
α(0)
β(0)
)(
α(1)
β(1)
)(
α(2)
β(2)
)
· · · is in L, otherwise Player I
wins.
Given a delay function f , a strategy for Player I is a mapping τ : Σ∗O → Σ
∗
I
where |τ(w)| = f(|w|), and a strategy for Player O is a mapping σ : Σ∗I → ΣO.
Consider a play (u0, v0)(u1, v1)(u2, v2) · · · of Γf (L). It is consistent with τ , if
ui = τ(v0 · · · vi−1) for every i ∈ N. It is consistent with σ, if vi = σ(u0 · · ·ui) for
every i ∈ N.
Remark 1. As usual, a strategy has only access to the opponents’s moves, but not
its own ones. However, this is not a restriction, since they can be reconstructed.
Fix a strategy τ for Player I: in round i, the input to τ is the concatena-
tion v0 · · · vi−1 of Player O’s previous moves. The moves u0, . . . , ui−1 by Player I
in the previous rounds are given by uj = τ(v0 · · · vj−1) for every j < i.
Now, fix a strategy σ for Player O: in round i, the input to σ is the con-
catenation u0 · · ·ui of Player I’s moves in the previous rounds, where each uj
for j ≤ i satisfies |uj| = f(j). Thus, the moves v0, . . . , vi−1 by Player O in the
previous rounds are given by vj = σ(u0 · · ·uj). Note this construction depends
on knowledge about the delay function f , as we decompose the input to σ to
obtain the prefix of length
∑j
j′=0 f(j
′).
A strategy τ for Player p ∈ {I, O} is winning, if every play that is consistent
with τ is winning for Player p. We say that a player wins Γf (L), if she has a
winning strategy and a delay game is determined, if one of the players wins it.
Example 1. Consider L0 over {a, b, c} × {b, c} with
(
α(0)
β(0)
)(
α(1)
β(1)
)(
α(2)
β(2)
)
· · · ∈ L0 if
α(n) = a for every n ∈ N or if β(0) = α(n), where n is the smallest position with
α(n) 6= a. Intuitively, Player O wins, if the letter she picks in the first round is
2 For pronomial convenience [12], we assume Player I to be male and Player O to be
female.
equal to the first letter other than a that Player I picks. Also, Player O wins, if
there is no such letter.
We claim that Player I wins Γf (L0) for every delay function f : he picks a
f(0)
in the first round and assume Player O picks b afterwards (the case where she
picks c is dual). Then, Player I picks a word starting with c in the second round.
The resulting play is winning for Player I no matter how it is continued. Thus,
Player I has a winning strategy in Γf (L0).
Finally, we also consider delay-free games. Formally, these can be seen as
delay games w.r.t. the delay function f with f(i) = 1 for every i, i.e., both
players pick a single letter in each round. As f is irrelevant, we denote such a
game with winning condition L by Γ (L).
2.2 The Borel Hierarchy
Fix an alphabet Σ. The Borel hierarchy of ω-languages over Σ consists of levels
Σα and Πα for every countable ordinal α > 0, which are defined inductively by
– Σ1 = {L ⊆ Σ
ω | L = K ·Σω for some K ⊆ Σ∗},
– Πα = {Σ
ω \ L | L ∈ Σα} for every α, and
– Σα = {
⋃
i∈N Li | Li ∈ Παi with αi < α for every i} for every α > 1.
The following basic properties will be useful later on.
Remark 2. Let α be a countable ordinal.
– Σα ∪Πα ⊆ Σα+1 ∩Πα+1.
– Σα and Πα are closed under finite unions and finite intersections.
A language L is Borel, if it is in one of the levels constituting the Borel
hierarchy.
Theorem 1 (Borel Determinacy Theorem [10]). Let L be Borel. Then,
Γ (L) is determined.
3 Borel Determinacy of Delay Games w.r.t. Fixed Delay
Functions
Fix alphabets ΣI and ΣO and a fresh skip symbol ⊲ /∈ ΣO, and define Σ
⊲
O =
ΣO∪{⊲}. To simplify our notation, let h be the morphism that removes the skip
symbol, i.e., the one defined by h(⊲) = ε and h(a) = a for every a ∈ ΣO. Also,
given two infinite words α and β we write
(
α
β
)
for the word
(
α(0)
β(0)
)(
α(1)
β(1)
)(
α(2)
β(2)
)
· · · .
Analogously, we write
(
x
y
)
for finite words x and y, provided they are of equal
length.
Given a delay function f and an infinite word β ∈ ΣωO we define shiftf (β) ∈
(Σ⊲O)
ω by
shiftf (β) = ⊲
f(0)−1β(0)⊲f(1)−1β(1)⊲f(2)−1β(2) · · · .
We lift this definition to languages L ⊆ (ΣI ×ΣO)
ω via shiftf (L) = {
(
α
shiftf (β)
)
|(
α
β
)
∈ L}. Intuitively, shiftf (L) encodes the delay function f explicitly by post-
poning Player O’s moves using skip symbols. Thus, the delay game Γf (L) and
the delay-free game Γ (shiftf (L)) are essentially equivalent: a winning strategy
for Player p ∈ {I, O} in Γf (L) can directly be translated into a winning strategy
for her in Γ (shiftf (L)) and vice versa.
The main result of this section states that delay games with Borel winning
conditions and w.r.t. fixed delay functions are determined.
Theorem 2. Let L be Borel and let f be a delay function. Then, Γf (L) is de-
termined.
Proof. We show that shiftf (L) is Borel. Then, our claim follows from the Borel
determinacy theorem, as Γ (shiftf (L)) and Γf(L) are essentially the same game.
We will prove the following statement, which is not the tightest result prov-
able, but which suffices for our purposes: if L ⊆ (ΣI × ΣO)
ω is in Σα (in
Πα), then shiftf (L) is in Σα+2 (in Πα+2). To this end, the language Uf =
shiftf ((ΣI × ΣO)
ω) will be useful. Note that Uf contains exactly those plays
during which the non-skip symbols are played at the positions consistent with
f . It is straightforward to show that Uf is in Π2.
First, assume we have L ∈ Σ1, i.e., L = K · (ΣI × ΣO)
ω for some K ⊆
(ΣI ×ΣO)
∗. Then, we have shiftf (L) = K
′ · (ΣI ×Σ
⊲
O)
ω ∩ Uf where
K ′ =
⋃
(α(0)β(0))···(
α(k)
β(k))∈K
{(
x
y
)
|y = ⊲f(0)−1β(0) · · · ⊲f(k)−1β(k) and
x ∈ α(0) · · ·α(k) ·Σ
|y|−(k+1)
I
}
,
i.e., shiftf (L) is in Π2 ⊆ Σ3.
Now, let L be in Πα, i.e., L = (ΣI ×ΣO)
ω \ L′ for some L′ ∈ Σα. Applying
the induction hypothesis yields that shiftf (L
′) is in Σα+2. We have
shiftf (L) = ((ΣI ×Σ
⊲
O)
ω \ shiftf (L
′)) ∩ Uf ,
i.e., shiftf (L) ∈ Πα+2.
Finally, assume we have L ∈ Σα for some α > 1, i.e., L =
⋃
i∈N Li with
Li ∈ Παi for some αi < α. An application of the induction hypothesis shows
that every shiftf (Li) is in Παi+2. Thus, shiftf (L) =
⋃
i∈N shiftf (Li) is in Σα+2
as αi + 2 < α+ 2 for every i.
Furthermore, from the equivalence of Γ (shiftf (L)) and Γf (L), which holds for
arbitrary L, we obtain a result that is applicable to non-Borel winning conditions
as well.
Corollary 1. If Γ (shiftf (L)) is determined, then so is Γf (L).
4 Omnipotent Strategies in Delay Games
In this section, we discuss different notions of strategies for delay games. The
one introduced in Subsection 2.1 is the classical one that was used in previous
works [5,6,9,18]. However, such strategies depend on a fixed delay function f ,
i.e., they are not useful for a game w.r.t. a delay function f ′ 6= f . This is a
syntactic dependence in the case of Player I, as he has to determine f(i) letters
in round i. But even Player O’s strategies may depend implicitly on knowledge
about the delay function under consideration, as we will see below.
In this section, we consider several stronger notions of universal strategies,
i.e., strategies that are independent of the delay function under consideration.
Informally, for Player I such a strategy returns an infinite word w ∈ ΣωI and the
first f(i) letters of w are used in round i of a delay game w.r.t. f . For Player O,
a universal strategy still returns a single letter, but it may no longer depend
on information about the delay function under consideration. We say that a
universal strategy is omnipotent for a winning condition L, if the strategy is
winning for every delay game Γf (L), independently of the choice of f .
Example 2. Again, consider the winning condition L0 from Example 1 and the
strategy τ : Σ∗O → Σ
ω
I given by τ(ε) = a
ω, τ(bx) = cω, and τ(cx) = bω for
x ∈ Σ∗O. Intuitively, in round 0, Player I can pick as many a’s as f requires
and then always picks c (or b), if Player O has picked b (or c) in round 0. This
strategy is winning for him w.r.t. every f and therefore omnipotent for L0.
4.1 Omnipotent Strategies for Player I
We consider the following variants of universal strategies for Player I, which
differ in the amount of information about the play’s history they base their
decision on. In the example above, the strategy τ only has access to Player O’s
moves, which is sufficient to be winning. More powerful notions have (directly or
indirectly) access to Player I’s moves or to information about the delay function
under consideration. Note that Player I cannot reconstruct his moves, if he only
has access to Player O’s moves, but not the delay function under consideration,
which explains the need to access his own moves.
1. An output-tracking (o.t.) strategy is a map τ : Σ∗O → Σ
ω
I . Consider a play
(u0, v0)(u1, v1)(u2, v2) · · · of Γf (L) for some f : it is consistent with τ , if ui is
the prefix of length f(i) of τ(v0 · · · vi−1). An o.t. strategy bases its decisions
only on the moves vj of Player O for j ≤ i and can deduce the number of
rounds already played, but has no way to reconstruct Player I’s previous
moves. In fact, it cannot even reconstruct the number of letters picked by
Player I thus far.
2. A lookahead-counting (l.c.) strategy is a mapping τ : Σ∗O × N → Σ
ω
I . This
time, we say that a play (u0, v0)(u1, v1)(u2, v2) · · · of Γf (L) for some f is
consistent with τ , if ui is the prefix of length f(i) of τ(v0 · · · vi−1,
∑i−1
j=0 f(j)).
A l.c. strategy has access to the opponent’s moves and the number of letters
picked by Player I thus far. However, this still does not suffice for Player I
to reconstruct the actual letters already picked.
3. An input-output-tracking (i.o.t.) strategy is a mapping τ : Σ∗O × Σ
∗
I → Σ
ω
I .
We define a play (u0, v0)(u1, v1)(u2, v2) · · · of Γf(L) for some f to be con-
sistent with τ , if ui is the prefix of τ(u0 · · ·ui−1, v0 · · · vi−1) of length f(i).
An i.o.t. strategy has access to both players’ moves thus far, but cannot
reconstruct when the moves of Player O were made.
4. A history-tracking (h.t.) strategy is a mapping τ : Σ∗O×(N+)
∗ → ΣωI . Again,
consider a play (u0, v0)(u1, v1)(u2, v2) · · · of Γf(L) for some f : it is consistent
with τ , if ui is the prefix of length f(i) of τ(v0 · · · vi−1, f(0) · · · f(i − 1)). A
h.t. strategy has access to the opponent’s moves and to the values of the
delay function for all previous rounds, which allows him to reconstruct his
moves. Thus, giving him additionally access to his previous moves does not
increase the strength of such a strategy.
As usual, we say that a strategy (of any type) is winning for Player I in
Γf (L) if the outcome of every play that is consistent with the strategy is in the
complement of L. A strategy is omnipotent for L, if it is winning for Player I in
Γf (L) for every f .
The definitions above are given in order of increasing expressiveness, e.g.,
every (omnipotent) o.t. strategy can be turned into an (omnipotent) l.c. strat-
egy inducing the same plays. The first two constructions are straightforward,
and for the last one, Player I has to reconstruct his moves u0, . . . , ui−1 using
the information about the values f(0), . . . , f(i − 1) and knowledge of his own
i.o.t. strategy.
Our first result shows that the first three types of strategies form a strict
hierarchy in terms of the games that can be won with them. The last case will
be discussed in Section 7: it is open whether omnipotent l.c. strategies are strictly
stronger than i.o.t. strategies.
Theorem 3. There are winning conditions L1 and L2 such that
1. Player I has an omnipotent l.c. strategy for L1, but no omnipotent o.t. strat-
egy, and
2. Player I has an omnipotent i.o.t. strategy for L2, but no omnipotent l.c. strat-
egy.
Proof. 1.) Let L1 = {
(
α
β
)
| α 6= (ab)ω}. Intuitively, Player I wins a game with
winning condition L1 if he is able to produce the word (ab)
ω , the moves of
Player O are irrelevant. Indeed, one can easily build a l.c. strategy τ by defining
τ(x, n) = (ab)ω for even n and τ(x, n) = (ba)ω for odd n. Every outcome of a
play that is consistent with τ has (ab)ω in its first component and is therefore
winning for Player I. Hence, τ is omnipotent for L1.
However, we claim that Player I has no omnipotent o.t. strategy τ for L1. If
τ(ε) 6= (ab)ω, then τ is losing for some f such that f(0) is larger than the first
position where τ(ε) and (ab)ω differ. Thus, we can assume τ(ε) = (ab)ω. Now,
fix some letter c ∈ ΣO and consider the first letter of τ(c): if it is a (the other
case is dual), then τ is losing for every f with odd f(0), as the first component
of the resulting outcome contains two a’s in a row, if Player O picks c in the first
round.
2.) Fix ΣI = {a, b, c} and ΣO = {b, c}, and define
L2 = (ΣI ×ΣO)
ω \
{(
α
β
)
| α ∈ an0 β(0) an1 β(1) ·ΣωI with n1 > n0
}
,
i.e., in order to win, Player I has to copy the first two letters picked by Player O
and ensure to produce more a’s between these two positions than before the first
one. It is straightforward to show that the following i.o.t. strategy for Player I
is omnipotent for L2:
τ(x, y) =


aω if x = ε,
x(0) aω if |x| = 1,
an−k+1 x(1) aω if |x| > 1 and y = anx(0)ak,
aω otherwise.
Intuitively, Player I picks a’s until Player O has picked her first letter, which is
immediately copied by Player I. Then, he picks a’s until he has access to the
second letter picked by Player O and then continues doing so until the second
a-block is longer than the first one. Then, he copies Player O’s second letter and
only picks a’s afterwards. Note that it is crucial for Player I to have access to
his own previous moves to guarantee that the second a-block is longer than the
first one and that he does not necessarily pick x(1) in the second round.
Next, we show that Player I has no omnipotent l.c. strategy for L2. Towards
a contradiction, assume there is one, call it τ . We claim that τ(x, n) begins with
aa, ax(0), or x(0)a for every input (x, n) with 2|x| ≤ n. This is straightforward
for x = ε and n = 0 (the cases (ε, n) with n > 0 are irrelevant), since τ(ε, 0) has
to be equal to aω. If not, Player O would have a counterstrategy against τ w.r.t.
some large enough f by picking c in round 0, if the first non-a letter in τ(ε, 0) is
b and vice versa.
It remains to consider an input (x, n) satisfying 0 < 2|x| ≤ n. Consider a
delay function f satisfying f(0) = n−|x|+1, f(i) = 1 for i in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and f(n+1) = 2. Now, use τ in Γf (L2) against Player O picking the letters of x in
the first |x| rounds: Player I picks af(0) in the first round, and α(1), . . . , α(|x|−1)
during the next |x| − 1 rounds, while Player O picks x(0), . . . , x(|x| − 1). Note
that we have |af(0)α(1) · · ·α(|x| − 1)| = n; the next letters picked by Player I
are therefore the first two of τ(x, n).
We consider two cases: if α(j) = a for every j, then the next two letters
picked by τ may contain only a’s, or one a and the first letter of x, but not any
other combination. Especially, the second letter of x may not yet be picked, since
the resulting a-block would be of length zero, which would results in a losing
play. On the other hand, if there is a j such that α(j) = x(0) then, all other
α(j′) have to be equal to a, since the second a-block would again be too short
otherwise. Thus, the first a-block has at least length n− |x| + 1, which implies
that the second a-block has at most length |x| − 2 after round n. As we have
n− |x|+ 1 ≥ |x|+ 2, we conclude that the next two letters picked by τ have to
be both an a.
To conclude, apply τ in Γf ′(L2) for the delay function f
′ with f ′(i) = 2 for
every i against Player O picking b and c in the first two rounds. As shown above,
τ will pick aa, ab, or ba in every round. Thus, the resulting outcome is losing for
Player I, as he never picks a c.
Note that the winning condition L1 is ω-regular and even recognizable by a
deterministic ω-automaton with reachability acceptance condition, and therefore
in Σ1. Furthermore, the winning condition L2 is not ω-regular, but recognizable
by a deterministic ω-pushdown automaton with safety acceptance, and in Π1.
4.2 Omnipotent Strategies for Player O
Now, we consider universal strategies for Player O. The standard definition given
in Subsection 2.1 is syntactically independent of a fixed delay function. However,
the reconstruction of Player O’s moves made in previous rounds depends on
knowledge about f . This can be exploited to show that strategies for Player O
that have access to the number of rounds played already are more powerful than
strategies which do not. Formally, we consider two types of omnipotent strategies
for Player O corresponding to the first two notions for Player I. The other two
notions introduced for Player I are not necessary for Player O.
1. An input-tracking (i.t.) strategy is a mapping σ : Σ∗I → ΣO. Consider a
play (u0, v0)(u1, v1)(u2, v2) · · · of Γf (L) for some f : it is consistent with σ,
if vi = σ(u0 · · ·ui). Such a strategy cannot reconstruct Player O’s previous
moves and cannot even determine how many rounds were played already.
2. A round-counting (r.c.) strategy is a mapping σ : Σ∗I ×N→ ΣO. This, time,
we say that a play (u0, v0)(u1, v1)(u2, v2) · · · of Γf (L) for some f is consistent
with the strategy σ, if vi = σ(u0 · · ·ui, i). A r.c. strategy has access to the
opponent’s moves and the number of rounds played thus far.
Note the asymmetry between the counting strategies for Player I and Play-
er O: Player I counts the number of letters he has picked thus far and therefore,
as he has direct access to Player O’s moves, the size of the lookahead. Player O
counts the number of rounds, i.e., the number of letters she has picked thus far.
Again, this allows her to determine the size of the lookahead, as she has access
to Player I’s moves. Omnipotency for Player O’s strategies is defined as before.
Also, as for Player I, every i.t. strategy can be turned into an r.c. strategy.
Finally, r.c. strategies are more powerful than i.t. ones.
Theorem 4. There is a winning condition L3 such that Player O has an om-
nipotent r.c. strategy for L3, but no omnipotent i.t. strategy.
The proof is a variation of the analogue for Player I: the winning condition
requires Player O to produce (ab)ω, which she can do, if she has access to the
number of rounds already played, but she cannot do it without this informa-
tion. Again, the distinguishing winning condition is very simple: it is ω-regular
and even recognizable by a deterministic ω-automaton with safety acceptance
condition, and therefore in Π1.
5 Borel Determinacy of Delay Games with Omnipotent
Strategies
Now, we turn our attention to delay games without fixed delay functions and
show that there is either a winning strategy for Player O for some f , or Player I
wins for every f with the same omnipotent strategy. Then, we show the dual
result for Player O.
We still use the notation introduced at the beginning of Section 3 and start
by defining skip(L) =
⋃
f shiftf (L), where there union ranges over all delay func-
tions f . Note that Player O loses a play in a game with winning condition skip(L)
if she picks ⊲ all but finitely often. Also, we have skip(L) = {
(
α
β
)
∈ (ΣI ×Σ
⊲
O)
ω |(
α
h(β)
)
∈ L}.
The tight connection between delay games Γf (L) for arbitrary f and the
delay-free game Γ (skip(L)) appears implicitly in the work by Holtmann et al. [6]
and is made explicit below. We exploit these connections to prove determinacy
of delay games with Borel winning conditions.
Theorem 5. Let L be Borel. Either, Player O wins Γf (L) for some f or Play-
er I has an omnipotent h.t. strategy for L.
Proof. First, we show that skip(L) is Borel and then apply the connection be-
tween the games Γf(L) for arbitrary f and Γ (skip(L)).
Proving skip(L) to be Borel is analogous to the proof for shiftf (L), we just
replace the intersections with Uf by intersections with U = skip((ΣI × ΣO)
ω)
(which is also in Π2) and the definition of K
′ in the induction start is changed
to
K ′ =
⋃
(α(0)β(0))···(
α(k)
β(k))∈K
{(
x
y
)
|y ∈ ⊲∗β(0) · · · ⊲∗β(k) and
x ∈ α(0) · · ·α(k) ·Σ
|y|−(k+1)
I
}
,
Thus, Γ (skip(L)) is determined.
Next, we show that Player O wins Γf (L) for some f , if she wins Γ (skip(L)).
Let σ′ be a winning strategy for Player O in Γ (skip(L)). We construct a delay
function f and a winning strategy σ for Player O in Γf (L) by simulating a play
in Γf (L) by a play in Γ (skip(L)).
We begin by defining f . For i ∈ N let ℓi be the maximal number such that
Player O picks at most i non-skip symbols during the first ℓi rounds in every play
of Γ (skip(L)) that is consistent with σ′. We claim that every ℓi is well-defined.
Assume ℓi for some fixed i is not. Then, the play prefixes under consideration for
defining ℓi form an infinite, but finitely branching tree. Hence, König’s Lemma
implies the existence of an infinite play that is consistent with σ′ during which
Player O all but finitely often picks ⊲. This play is losing for her, thus contra-
dicting σ′ being a winning strategy.
By construction, if Player I has picked ℓi + 1 letters in Γ (skip(L)), then
σ′ has determined at least i + 1 non-skip letters. Now, let f(0) = ℓ0 + 1 and
f(i + 1) = (ℓi+1 + 1)−
∑i
j=0 f(j). It remains to define σ: assume Player I has
picked u0, . . . , ui in rounds i = 0, 1, . . . , i with |uj | = f(j). Consider the play
prefix in Γ (skip(L)) during which Player I picks u0 · · ·ui and Player O plays
according to σ′. We define σ(u0 · · ·ui) to be the i-th non-skip letter (starting
with the 0-th letter) picked by Player O on this play prefix. This is well-defined
by the definition of f .
Let
(
α
β
)
an outcome that is consistent with σ. A straightforward induction
shows that there is a play in Γ (skip(L)) that is consistent with σ′ and has an
outcome
(
α
β′
)
such that β = h(β′). Hence, σ′ being a winning strategy implies(
α
β′
)
∈ skip(L) and therefore
(
α
β
)
∈ L. Thus, σ is a winning strategy for Player O
in Γf (L).
To conclude, we show that Player I has an omnipotent h.t. strategy τ for L,
if he wins Γ (skip(L)). To this end, let τ ′ : (Σ⊲O)
∗ → ΣI be a winning strategy
for Player I in Γ (skip(L)). We define an h.t. strategy τ : Σ∗O × (N+)
∗ → ΣωO.
Let x ∈ Σ∗O and n0 · · ·ni−1 ∈ (N+)
∗. Note that τ will only be applied to in-
puts (x, n0 · · · , ni−1) where |x| = i. Thus, we restrict our attention to those
inputs. Let
x′ = ⊲n0−1 x(0) ⊲n1−1 x(1) · · · ⊲ni−1−1 x(i − 1) ∈ (Σ⊲O)
∗
and define
τ(x, n0 · · ·ni−1) = τ
′(x′) τ ′(x′⊲) τ ′(x′⊲⊲) τ ′(x′⊲⊲⊲) · · · ,
i.e., the answers according to τ ′ to Player O picking ⊲ ad infinitum after picking
x′.
A straightforward induction shows that for every outcome
(
α
β
)
that is con-
sistent with τ in Γf (L) for some f , there is an outcome
(
α
β′
)
that is consistent
with τ ′ such that h(β′) = β. As τ ′ is winning for Player I in Γ (skip(L)) we have(
α
β′
)
/∈ skip(L) and thus
(
α
β
)
/∈ L. Hence, τ is winning for Γf (L) for every f and
therefore omnipotent for L.
The second part of the proof above (the equivalence of the delay games and
the delay-free game) works for arbitrary winning conditions. Hence, we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 2. If Γ (skip(L)) is determined, then either Player O wins Γf (L) for
some f or Player I has an omnipotent h.t. strategy for L.
It is open whether these results hold for i.o.t. strategies as well. This is related
to the strictness of the strategy hierarchy mentioned earlier: is there a winning
condition L such that Player I has an omnipotent h.t. strategy for L, but no
omnipotent i.o.t. strategy? We discuss this question in Section 7.
To conclude this section, let us consider the case where Player O wins Γf (L)
for every delay function f . Here, we apply a monotonicity argument: the larger
the lookahead is, the more information Player O has at her disposal, which
makes winning easier for her. Thus, if she wins w.r.t. every delay function, then
she wins in particular without lookahead. A winning strategy for the delay-free
game can be turned into a winning strategy w.r.t. every larger delay function.
Thus, the omnipotent strategy for Player O mimics the behavior of a winning
strategy for the delay-free game and ignores the additional information given by
the lookahead.
Formally, we order delay functions by the amount of lookahead available for
Player O at every round: we define f ⊑ f ′, if and only if
∑i
j=0 f(j) ≤
∑i
j=0 f
′(j)
for every i ∈ N, i.e., in every round, the lookahead granted by f ′ is at least as
large as the one granted by f . A winning strategy for Player O w.r.t. f can
easily be turned into one for f ′ by ignoring the additional information. Thus, we
obtain the following monotonicity property.
Remark 3. If f ⊑ f ′ and Player O wins Γf (L), then also Γf ′(L).
Note that winning refers to winning strategies that may depend on f respec-
tively f ′. Nevertheless, we can use monotonicity to obtain omnipotent strategies
by considering the ⊑-minimal delay function. More formally, if Player O wins
Γf (L) for every f , then she wins in particular the delay-free game Γ (L), i.e., the
game w.r.t. the ⊑-minimal delay-function i 7→ 1. It is easy to see that a winning
strategy σ′ for Player O in Γ (L) can be turned into an omnipotent r.c. strat-
egy σ for L: defining σ(x, i) = σ′(x(0) · · ·x(i − 1)) simulates the strategy σ′ by
ignoring the additional information gained due to the lookahead.
Theorem 6. Either, Player I wins Γf (L) for some f or Player O has an om-
nipotent r.c. strategy for L.
As shown in Theorem 4, such a strategy has to have access to the number of
rounds already played, the theorem does not hold for input-tracking strategies.
Note however, that this results holds for arbitrary winning conditions L.
A similar construction works if Player O does not have an omnipotent strat-
egy for L, but wins Γf (L) for some f . Then, she can simulate a winning strategy
for Γf (L) in Γf ′(L) for every f
′ ⊒ f .
6 Decidability
In this section, we consider decision problems regarding omnipotent strategies,
i.e., we are interested in determining whether a given player has an omnipotent
strategy for a given winning condition L.
We begin with ω-regular conditions represented by deterministic parity au-
tomata.
Theorem 7. The following problems are ExpTime-complete respectively in
NP ∩ co-NP:
1. Given a deterministic parity automaton A, does Player I have an omnipotent
h.t. strategy for L(A)?
2. Given a deterministic parity automaton A, does Player O have an omnipo-
tent r.c. strategy for L(A)?
Proof. 1.) Due to Theorem 5, Player I has an omnipotent h.t. strategy for L(A) if
and only if there is no f such that Player O wins Γf (L(A)). Determining whether
there is an f such that Player O wins Γf (L(A)) is ExpTime-complete [9]. Hence,
determinacy of ω-regular delay games w.r.t. fixed delay functions and closure of
ExpTime under complements yields the desired result.
2.) Due to Theorem 6, Player O has an omnipotent r.c. strategy for L(A) if
and only if she wins Γ (L(A)). This game can be encoded as a parity game in
an arena of size 2|A| that has the same colors as A. The winner of this game is
solvable in NP ∩ co-NP (and even UP ∩ co-UP [8]), which yields the desired
result.
An omnipotent r.c. strategy for Player O can be implemented by a finite
automaton with output of sizeO(|A|), e.g., if the input (x, n) ∈ Σ∗I×N with |x| ≥
n is encoded as x(0) · · ·x(n− 1)#x(n) · · · x(|x| − 1), where # is a fresh symbol.
The states of the automaton are the vertices of the parity game constructed in
the proof above and the output function is given by a positional winning strategy
for this game.
Now, we turn our attention to ω-context-free winning conditions. Such lan-
guages are recognized by ω-pushdown automata, classical pushdown-automata
running on infinite words. We refer to [1] for detailed definitions. First, we con-
sider deterministic automata.
Theorem 8. The following problems are undecidable respectively ExpTime-
complete:
1. Given a deterministic ω-pushdown automaton A, does Player I have an
omnipotent h.t. strategy for L(A)?
2. Given a deterministic ω-pushdown automaton A, does Player O have an
omnipotent r.c. strategy for L(A)?
Proof. Recall that delay games with winning conditions that are recognized by
deterministic ω-pushdown automata and w.r.t. fixed delay functions are deter-
mined [5].
1.) As in the ω-regular case, Player I has an omnipotent h.t. strategy for
L(A) if and only if there is no f such that Player O wins Γf (L(A)). Determining
whether there is an f such that PlayerO wins Γf (L(A)) is undecidable [5]. Hence,
determinacy w.r.t. fixed delay functions implies undecidability of the problem.
2.) Again, as in the ω-regular case, the problem can be reduced to solving
the delay-free game Γ (L(A)), which is ExpTime-complete [16].
As before, an omnipotent r.c. strategy for Player O can be represented finitely
by constructing a pushdown-automaton with output that implements a win-
ning strategy for the delay-free game Γ (L(A)), which can be constructed effec-
tively [16].
To conclude, we consider non-deterministic ω-pushdown automata.
Theorem 9. The following problems are undecidable:
1. Given a non-deterministic ω-pushdown automaton A, does Player I have an
omnipotent l.c. (i.o.t., h.t.) strategy for L(A)?
2. Given a non-deterministic ω-pushdown automaton A, does Player O have
an omnipotent r.c. strategy for L(A)?
Proof. Recall that the (non-)universality problem for non-deterministic ω-push-
down automata is undecidable (see, e.g., [3]). Given such an automaton A, we
define the winning condition IA = {
(
α
α
)
| α ∈ L(A)}, i.e., in order to win, Player I
has to produce an α /∈ L(A).
1). We prove undecidability for the case of l.c. strategies by a reduction from
the non-universality problem. The other cases are proven similarly.
We claim that L(A) is non-universal if and only if Player I has an omnipotent
l.c. strategy for IA. Let L(A) be non-universal, i.e., we can fix some α /∈ L(A).
Then, there is a l.c. strategy for Player I that produces α, independently of
the moves of Player O. Hence, this strategy is omnipotent for IA. Now, if IA is
universal then Player O wins Γ (IA) by just copying Player I’s moves. Hence,
Player I has no omnipotent strategy for IA.
2.) We claim that L(A) is universal if and only if Player O has an omnipotent
r.c. strategy for IA. Above, we have shown that IA being universal implies that
Player O wins Γf (IA) for every f . Hence, due to Theorem 6, Player O has an
omnipotent r.c. strategy for IA. On the other hand, as seen above, if IA is non-
universal, then Player I has an omnipotent strategy for IA, which implies that
IA has none.
It is open whether the problems asking for weaker types of omnipotent strate-
gies are decidable. We discuss these problems in the next section.
7 Characterizing the Existence of Omnipotent Strategies
In this section, we give a characterization of omnipotent strategies for delay
games in terms of uniform strategies for delay-free games. We focus on the case
of i.o.t. strategies for Player I, but the other cases are analogous.
Fix some strategy τ : (Σ⊲O)
∗ → ΣI and define the equivalence relation≈τ over
(Σ⊲O)
∗ via x0 ≈ x1 if and only if |x0| = |x1|, h(x0) = h(x1), and τ(x
′
0) = τ(x
′
1)
for all proper prefixes x′0 ⊏ x0 and x
′
1 ⊏ x1 with |x
′
0| = |x
′
1|. Thus, x0 and x1 are
equivalent, if Player O has picked the same sequence of non-skip symbols in x0
and in x1, has picked the same number of skip symbols (but possibly at different
positions), and τ picked the same moves answering to Player O picking x0 and
x1, respectively, during the previous rounds.
Now, we say that a strategy τ for Player I in Γf (skip(L)) is i.o.-uniform if
τ(x) = τ(x′) for all x ≈τ x
′. The following lemma is a straightforward extension
of Theorem 5.
Lemma 1. Player I has an omnipotent i.o.t. strategy if and only if Player I
has an i.o.-uniform winning strategy for Γ (skip(L)).
We conjecture that Player I always has such a uniform strategy.
Conjecture 1. If Player I wins Γ (skip(L)), then she has an i.o.-uniform winning
strategy for Γ (skip(L)).
Note that we do not impose any requirements on L. If the conjecture is true,
then Theorem 5 is also true for i.o.t. strategies.
The existence of an omnipotent o.t., l.c., or i.t. strategy for a winning condi-
tion L can be characterized analogously using appropriate equivalence relations
that capture the limited access to information about the history of a play that
such a strategy has.
Furthermore, the existence of such uniform strategies can be expressed in
the framework introduced by Maubert and Pinchinat [11]: they investigate infi-
nite games under uniformity constraints on strategies expressed in an extension
of LTL with a modality to equate finite play prefixes that are in some given
equivalence relation. The logic is able to express the uniformity constraint for-
mulated above, but our problems are not in the decidable fragment presented
in this work, as the equivalence relations that characterize universal strategies
are not rational (recognizable by an asynchronous transducer) and turning an
ω-regular L into skip(L) does not preserve ω-regularity.
8 Conclusion
We presented determinacy results for delay games with Borel winning conditions,
both with and without respect to fixed delay functions: in the latter case, we
showed the existence of omnipotent strategies, i.e., strategies that are winning
w.r.t. every delay function. In particular, we analyzed the exact amount of infor-
mation such a strategy needs about the history of the play and the delay function
under consideration. For games w.r.t. a fixed delay function, on which winning
strategies may depend, access to the opponent’s moves is sufficient. However,
for omnipotent strategies the situation is more intricate: Player O needs access
to the opponent’s moves and the number of rounds played thus far, just having
access to the opponent’s moves is not sufficient. For Player I, we showed that
access to both player’s moves is necessary and having the full information about
the play’s history is trivially sufficient. However, it is open whether that much
information is necessary: does access to both player’s previous moves, but not
to the delay function under consideration, suffice to implement an omnipotent
strategy? To answer this question, we currently work on resolving Conjecture 1.
Also, we determined the precise computational complexity of decision prob-
lems of the following form for ω-regular and ω-context-free winning conditions:
given a winning condition L, does Player p ∈ {I, O} have an omnipotent strategy
for L?
Another interesting question concerns the decision problems left open in Sec-
tion 6: can one decide if Player I has an omnipotent o.t. (l.c., i.o.t.) strategy for
a given ω-regular winning condition? The analogous question for Player O and
input-tracking strategies is also open. Furthermore, we left open the finite repre-
sentability of omnipotent strategies for Player I for ω-regular winning conditions.
We expect the techniques we developed to give an exponential-time algorithm
for solving ω-regular delay games [9] to yield such strategies, but this is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Another interesting open problem is to develop a theory of finite-state and
positional winning strategies for delay games, both for the case with a fixed delay
function and the universal case, and to prove positional respectively finite-state
determinacy results.
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